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Introduction
Extradition—the formal rendition of criminal fugitives between states1—is an 
indispensable part of the cooperative machinery that underpins the international 
community’s ongoing battle against transnational crime. The regime of transna-
tional criminal law that emerged during the 20th century2 has always had, as a 
core policy imperative, the need to ensure that offenders face criminal prosecu-
tion before domestic courts which have jurisdiction over their crimes, and which 
therefore require jurisdiction over their persons. As crimes and criminals cross 
borders, so too must the law enforcement tools that enable their apprehension, 
and extradition is one of the foremost tools that facilitate prosecutions.
However, even decades ago it was already described as being “fashion-
able”3 to acknowledge the potential issues arising from the need to: make extra-
dition efficient and effective, on one hand; and on the other hand, ensure that the 
human rights of accused persons are protected and not violated by the manner 
in which either the requesting state or the requested state execute their extra-
dition processes. As extradition is a law enforcement process, administered by 
the state, it clearly implicates the civil/procedural rights of people targeted by in-
vestigations. The parameters of how human rights are engaged in the extradition 
process, and in international criminal cooperation generally, are less clear and 
have generated controversy.4 It is therefore not uncommon to encounter litera-
ture5 and case law6 on how various human rights and rights-related obligations 
1 A more complete definition is “the formal rendition of a criminal fugitive from a state that has custody 
(the requested state) to a state that wishes either to prosecute or, if the fugitive has already been convicted 
of an offence, to impose a penal sentence (the requesting state)” (Robert J. Currie & Joseph Rikhof, Inter-
national & Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin, 2013) at 478).
2 See generally Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Oxford University 
Press, 2018). Though it is worth noting that extradition is one of the most ancient forms of international 
cooperation, having emerged as early as ancient Egyptian times: Ivan A. Shearer, Extradition in International 
Law (Ocean Publications, 1971) at 5.
3 C. van den Wyngaert, “Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening 
Pandora’s Box?” (1990) 39 ICLQ 757 at 757.
4 R.J. Currie, “The Protection of Human Rights in Transnational Criminal Law” in Neil Boister & Robert 
J. Currie, eds, Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law (Routledge, 2015) 27
5 J. Dugard & C. van den Wyngaert, “Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights” (1998) 92 AJIL 187; 
V.P. Nanda, “Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital Punishment and Torture” (1999) 
23 Fordham Int’l L J 1369; Joanna Harrington, “The Role for Human Rights Obligations in Canadian Extra-
dition Law” [2005] 43 CYBIL 45
6 The classic case is Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 (ECtHR); and see Kindler v. 
Canada, Comm No 470/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993) (UN Hum Rts Committee); United 
States v. Burns, [2001] 1 SCR 283 (Sup Ct of Canada).
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are impacted by extradition, for example the right to life (in death penalty cases),7 
the prohibition against transfer to torture,8 and so on.
A procedural rights issue that gets less attention vis-à-vis extradition is the 
right of an accused person to receive a fair trial within a reasonable time. Ex-
tradition is well-known to be a time-consuming process and often has impacts, 
minor or major, on the ability of the state to complete prosecution in a timely 
manner. These impacts in turn engage interesting questions, in particular what 
the duties of a state are in actively pursuing extradition and how delays in the 
process might factor into determination of whether the right is being respected.
The modest goal of this article is to examine how this issue has played 
out recently in the courts of a single state, Canada. Canada is party to major 
international human rights instruments,9 has a constitutionalized human rights 
code in the form of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,10 and has a 
robust extradition practice based on a number of bilateral and multilateral treaty 
relationships.11 Accordingly, it is our hope that survey and analysis of how Cana-
dian law has responded to the interaction between extradition and the right to 
trial within a reasonable time will be of interest, and potentially instructive, as an 
example of state practice under international human rights law and of the kinds 
of practical considerations that can arise.
The Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time
a) International Human Rights Law
A tired but true old maxim is that “justice delayed is justice denied”, and the 
obvious good sense of this truism is reflected in the fact that trial within a rea-
sonable time is a feature of all of the major international human rights regimes. 
Of primary concern here is the ICCPR, to which Canada is a party along with 
7 Bharat Malkani, “The Obligation to Refrain from Assisting the Use of the Death Penalty” (2013) 62 
ICLQ 523.
8 J.G. Johnston, “The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use of Diplomatic 
Assurances to Protect Against Torture After 9/11” (2011) 11 ICLR 1.
9 Most relevant here is the fact that Canada is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). A complete list of human rights treaties to which Canada is party 
can be found on the Government of Canada website, at the following URL: < https://www.canada.ca/en/
canadian-heritage/services/canada-united-nations-system/treaties.html >.
10 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Cana-
da Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
11 See generally Seth Weinstein & Nancy Dennison, Prosecuting and Defending Extradition Cases 
(Emond Montgomery, 2017); Gary Botting, Canadian Extradition Law Practice, 5th ed (LexisNexis, 2015).
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the majority of states in the world.12 Article 14(3)(c) of the treaty provides that, “In 
the determination of any criminal charge”, individuals have the right “to be tried 
without undue delay.”13 Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights 
guarantees criminal trials “within a reasonable time”,14 with identical wording in 
article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,15 article 
7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 and articles 7(5) and 
8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights.17
The right to trial within a reasonable time is of fairly ancient origin, dating back 
as early as the Magna Carta, and has been referred to as “a basic component of 
civilized legal systems”.18 In all of the human rights instruments it is contextually 
included as part of an overall package of fair trial rights, and the policy rationale 
which underpins it is quite clear. As Bassiouni notes, it “limits infringements on 
personal freedom caused by pretrial and trial detention”, is “crucial to the guar-
antee of a fair trial because undue delays may cause the loss of evidence or the 
fading of the memories of the witnesses,” and “seeks to minimise the emotional 
strain on the accused caused by pending criminal proceedings”.19 As regards 
article 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR specifically, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
stated:
The right of the accused to be tried without undue delay, pro-
vided for by article 14, paragraph 3 (c), is not only designed to 
avoid keeping persons too long in a state of uncertainty about their 
fate and, if held in detention during the period of the trial, to ensure 
that such deprivation of liberty does not last longer than necessary 
12 The ratification status of the ICCPR (which as of October 2018 had 172 parties) can be found on the 
website of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, at the following URL: < http://indica-
tors.ohchr.org/ >.
13 This “without undue delay” formulation also appears in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia (art. 21(4)(c)), the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (art. 
20(4)(c)) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (art. 67(1)(c)). See Brian Farrell, “The Right 
to a Speedy Trial Before International Criminal Tribunals” (2003) 19 South African J Hum Rts 98.
14 ETS No 5 (1950). This protection actually encompasses both civil and criminal trials, though it is dealt 
with differently as regards each; see Frédéric Edel, Human rights files no. 16: The length of civil and criminal 
proceedings in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 2nd ed (Council of Europe Publishing, 
2007).
15 Official Journal of the European Union, C 326 (26 October 2012).
16 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3, rev. 5 (27 June 1981).
17 OASTS No 36 (22 November 1969).
18 Frank Addario and Megan Savard, “The Fast and the Furious 11(b): Is the Speedy Trial a Dying Fran-
chise?” (2017) 36 Adv. J. 20.
19 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Proce-
dural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions” (1999) 3 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 235 
at 285.
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in the circumstances of the specific case, but also to serve the 
interests of justice. What is reasonable has to be assessed in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account mainly the com-
plexity of the case, the conduct of the accused, and the manner 
in which the matter was dealt with by the administrative and judi-
cial authorities. In cases where the accused are denied bail by the 
court, they must be tried as expeditiously as possible. This guaran-
tee relates not only to the time between the formal charging of the 
accused and the time by which a trial should commence, but also 
the time until the final judgement on appeal. All stages, whether in 
first instance or on appeal must take place “without undue delay”.20
It is, of course, the responsibility of the state, via its criminal prosecution and 
judicial systems, to ensure that the right is upheld, and at least under the ICCPR 
the burden of proof is on the state to justify delay, particularly on the basis of the 
complexity of the case.21 However, it is clear that a determination of whether a 
trial has proceeded within a reasonable time can consider the conduct of the 
accused person. The Human Rights Committee, for example, has examined 
whether an accused’s decision to change lawyers contributed unnecessarily to 
the delay,22 and in one case held that the accused’s deliberate evasion of the 
authorities meant that most of the delay was not attributable to the state.23 Sim-
ilarly, the European Court of Human Rights incorporates the accused’s conduct 
as part of its overall consideration of how delay impacts upon the “reasonable-
ness” of the time the prosecution consumed.24 It has noted that while there is 
no obligation on the accused to cooperate with the authorities to advance the 
prosecution or to avoid any of the resources provided to him/her under the na-
tional law, a “determination to be obstructive” can count against him/her,25 as 
can other kind of delays including failure or lateness of filing pleadings, abscond-
ing from the jurisdiction, failure to appear, bogus filings, etc.26 The upshot, then, 
is that unnecessary delay by the accused does not count against the state, in 
terms of how long the clock of delay has run. As will be explored below, this is 
20 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 35.
21 Smantser v. Belarus, UN Doc No CCPR/C/94/D/1178/2003 (2008).
22 M. and B. Hill v. Spain, UN Doc A/52/40 (1997), para. 12.4.
23 Pavlovna Smirnova v. Russian Federation, UN Doc No C/81/D/712/1996 (1996).
24 Case of Kemmache v. France, judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A, No. 218, p. 20, para. 50; 
Frydlender v. France [GC], 27 June 2000, §43.
25 Case of Yagci and Sargin v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A, No. 319-A, p. 21, para. 66.
26 Edel, above note 14 at 51-57.
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an important factor in Canadian proceedings, and with particular regard to ex-
tradition has produced interesting results.
b) Canadian Law
Paragraph 11(b) of the Charter states that “any person charged with an 
offence has the right […] to be tried within a reasonable time”, which is indeed 
similar to the protections offered by the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights or the American Bill of Rights.27 Some would argue that this paragraph 
of the Charter is highly misunderstood and that it has few defenders,28 and it has 
certainly been the locus of much procedural and constitutional wrangling since 
the introduction of the Charter in 1982.
The framework to be applied to determine if this right has been violated has 
received constant attention from the Supreme Court of Canada over the years 
since 1986, when the Court first considered this provision.29 Without reviewing all 
the decisions from the Supreme Court on this matter, three major periods can be 
identified and detailed. First, some general considerations must be addressed.30 
As per the text of the provision, for the protection to be engaged the indi-
vidual must be charged with an offence, meaning that an information has been 
sworn against him or that a direct indictment has been laid.31 Furthermore, the 
term “offence” has been interpreted to mean “public offences involving punitive 
sanctions” 32. This means that the right to be tried within a reasonable time does 
not apply to all court proceedings.33
The first period in the Supreme Court literature on this question starts with 
Mills, Rahey34, and Conway35. While the Court was not unanimous on this matter, 
27 Only one year after the Charter was adopted, the Canadian protection against unreasonable delay 
was deemed to be similar to the American one, with some minor differences, most notably because the 
pre-indictment delay can be considered in the United States, but not in Canada. Walter S. Tarnopolsky, 
“The New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as Compared and Contrasted with the American Bill 
of Rights” (1983) 5 Hum. Rts. Q. 227, at 240. 
28 Frank Addario and Megan Savard, “The Fast and the Furious 11(b): Is the Speedy Trial a Dying Fran-
chise?”, (2017) 36 Adv. J. No. 1 20. 
29 R. v. Mills, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 [hereinafter Mills].
30 See also Steve Coughlan and Robert J. Currie, “Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Canadian Charter” 
(2013) 62 S.C.L.R. (2d) 143, at 184-187, for a pre-Jordan account. 
31 R. v. Kalanj, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594. 
32 R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, at 554.
33 Couglan and Currie, above, note 30, at 185-186. 
34 R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 [hereinafter Rahey]. 
35 R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 [hereinafter Conway].
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the principles were eventually harmonized in Smith36. In that decision, after hav-
ing discussed issues about jurisdiction, the Supreme Court confirmed that a 
fifteen-month delay between the laying of the charge and the beginning of the 
preliminary inquiry was unreasonable. To reach this conclusion, the Court used a 
four-step analysis that considered, “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for 
the delay, including limits on institutional resources and the inherent time require-
ments of the case; (3) waiver of time periods; and (4) prejudice to the accused.”37 
One year later, in Askov38, the Court was somewhat divided again on this matter, 
most notably on the question of the societal interest of seeing trials held within a 
reasonable time. The Court also suggested that a six to eight months guideline, 
from committal to the start of the trial, “might be deemed to be the outside limit 
of what is reasonable”.39
The Smith test was later modified, or rather refined, in Morin40, which marks 
the start of the second period of the Supreme Court’s analysis of paragraph 
11(b) of the Charter. In Morin, the Court confirmed that society had indeed an in-
terest, albeit secondary, “in seeing that the least fortunate of its citizens who are 
accused of crimes are treated humanely and fairly, [and that] trials held promptly 
enjoy the confidence of the public”.41 The Court also recognized that the inter-
ests of the accused will sometime clash with the societal interest in law enforce-
ment, most importantly in case of serious crimes42.
Although the Smith test was preserved in its essence by Morin, some correc-
tions were implemented by the Court, mainly because the Askov guidelines had 
caused some serious problems in the criminal court system. The test was thus 
modified and required the balancing of four factors: “(1) the length of the delay; 
(2) waiver of time periods; (3) the reasons for the delay, including (a) inherent time 
requirements of the case, (b) actions of the accused, (c) actions of the Crown,43 
(d) limits on institutional resources, and (e) other reasons for delay; and (4) prej-
udice to the accused.”44 While the application of the test remained discretionary, 
the Supreme Court definitely aimed to harmonize the various court decisions on 
this subject. Furthermore, the Askov guidelines were modified and changed to a 
36 R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [hereinafter Smith]. 
37 Smith, ibid., at 1131. 
38 R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 [hereinafter Askov]. 
39 Ibid., at 1240. 
40 R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter Morin]. 
41 Morin, above, note 40, at 786. 
42 Ibid., at 787. 
43 In Canada, as in the British system, both the federal and provincial prosecution services are referred 
to as “the Crown”.
44 Morin, above note 40, at 787-788. 
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period between eight and ten months for provincial courts45. However, the Court 
did stress the importance that these guidelines are flexible and to be adapted to 
the circumstances of the various provinces and regions in Canada46. 
Some seventeen years after Morin, the Supreme Court once again ad-
dressed the issue of unreasonable delays in Godin47. In Godin, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that prejudice could be inferred from the delay and that 
Justice Sopinka had been right to state in Morin that “[t]he longer the delay the 
more likely that such an inference will be drawn”.48 While Godin did not modify 
the applicable test, it attempted to shift the attitude towards prejudice in a man-
ner favourable to the accused.49 
More recently, amid rising dissatisfaction with delays in criminal cases, a 
complete overhaul of the parameters to be applied was set out by the Supreme 
Court in Jordan50, which marks the start of the third and last period in the Su-
preme Court’s analysis of paragraph 11(b) of the Charter. The majority in Jordan 
noted that the application of the Morin framework had caused some major prob-
lems in the criminal justice system “contributing to a culture of delay and com-
placency towards it”.51 Indeed, the criminal justice system had been plagued 
by inefficient and unnecessary procedure, causing some major delays in the 
system, but also a general sentiment that these delays were inevitable and justi-
fiable. The majority also found that the existing framework was too unpredictable 
and that the treatment of the prejudice aspect of the test was confusing. Thus, 
a new approach was put forward.
This new framework is based on a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for 
provincial courts and 30 months for superior courts. This delay represents the 
total delay from the laying of the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial, 
minus the defence delay (which is composed of the delay waiver by the defence 
and any delay caused solely by the defence in an illegitimate way52). If this delay 
exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the Crown will bear the onus of proving that 
the delay is nonetheless reasonable by establishing the presence of exceptional 
45 Ibid., at 799. In Canada, even though all criminal law is federal, jurisdiction over criminal offences is 
divided between the provincial courts (which are constituted by the provinces) and the superior courts 
(which are constituted by the federal government but administered by the provinces). A more narrow range 
of more serious offences, including all jury trials, are held in the superior courts.
46 Id., at 799-800. 
47 R. v. Godin, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Godin]. 
48 Ibid., at par. 31, citing Morin, above, note 40, at 801. 
49 Coughlan and Currie, above, note 30, at 193. 
50 R. v. Jordan, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631. 
51 Ibid., at para. 29. 
52 Id., at para. 61-65. 
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circumstances53, which could arise from a “discrete event” like an extradition 
proceeding54 or from a particularly complex case55. A contrario, if the delay is 
less than the presumptive ceiling and the accused still believes it is unreasona-
ble, he will need to establish that fact. He will be able to do so by proving that 
he tried to expedite the procedures and that the case should not have taken 
so long.56 Finally, Jordan also created a transitional exceptional circumstance57, 
“intended to blunt the impact of the new time limits and account for reasonable 
reliance on the previous delay jurisprudence”.58
By establishing a presumptive ceiling, the Jordan framework permanent-
ly installs the question of prejudice into the analysis, as prejudice “informs the 
setting of the presumptive ceiling”.59 Thus, once the ceiling is contravened, it is 
fair to presume that the accused’s rights, notably his liberty and security rights, 
were infringed. The Jordan framework has had major consequences across 
Canada60, and has been used in many cases where stays of proceedings were 
ordered61. However, in the long term, it is hoped that Jordan will have reduced 
overall delays, resulting in fewer stays under paragraph 11(b).62 
The importance of the mentality change intended to be wrought by Jordan 
was further stressed in Cody63, where the Court tried to put critiques of the 
Jordan framework to rest64. The Court, unanimously this time, refused to modify 
53 Id., at para. 48.
54 Id., at para. 72 and 81.
55 Id., at para. 71. 
56 Id., at para. 49. 
57 Id., at para. 95-102. See also R. v. Williamson, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741 (rendered at the same time as 
Jordan and providing an application of the transitional exceptional circumstance). 
58 Matthew R. Gourlay, “After Jordan: The Fate of the Speedy Trial and Prospects for Systemic Reform” 
(2017) 36 Adv. J. 22, at para. 16. 
59 Jordan, above, note 51, at para. 54.
60 It is said that about 6% of all charges completed in provincial court and 15% of all charges completed 
in superior court in 2015/2016 are over the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan. While this statistic 
does not necessarily mean that a stay of proceeding was granted or even requested, it does show that 
the criminal justice system will need to adapt to the Jordan framework. Ashley Maxwell, Canadian Centre 
for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada, “Adult criminal court processing times, Canada, 2015/2016” (Fe-
bruary 2018). ISSN 1209-6393.
61 For an application of Jordan in the province of Quebec see: Laura Ellyson, “Revue jurisprudentielle : 
les suites de l’arrêt Jordan au Québec”, Repères, June 2017, EYB2017REP2253. For an application in the 
province of Ontario, see: Cristin Schmitz, “‘Robust’ approach to timely trials, says defence lawyer” (2016) 
The Lawyers Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 22. See also Judge Wayne Gorman, “R. v. Jordan: Its Effect on Cases 
Already in the System” (2017) 64 C.L.Q. 240, for a list of cases applying the Jordan framework. 
62 Steve Coughlan, “Early Patterns in the New Section 11(b) Framework” (2016) 32 CR-ART 386, at 3. 
63 R. v. Cody, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659. 
64 And indeed, the Jordan framework was extensively critiqued. See inter alia Leonid Sirota, “Was the 
Supreme Court Right to Change the Law on the Right to a Speedy Trial” (2017) 26 Const. F. 1. 
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the Jordan framework, stating that a Supreme Court precedent cannot be light-
ly discarded or overruled65. Cody also brought some additional considerations 
about defence delay,66 most notably that not every delay caused by the defence 
must be deducted under this component67. Effectively, an accused has the right 
to make full answer and defence, which allows him to take legitimate action to 
respond to the charges laid against him. The only defence delay that is deduct-
ible is that which: “(1) is solely or directly caused by the accused person; and 
(2) flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch as it is not taken to 
respond to the charges.”68 The determination of what consists a legitimate ac-
tion, or inaction, is a highly discretionary decision to be made by the first instance 
judge, whose finding is deserving of deference upon appellate review.69 The 
Court in Cody also stresses the importance of the proposition that “[d]efence 
counsel may still pursue all available substantive and procedural means to de-
fend their client. What defence counsel are not permitted to do is to engage in 
illegitimate conduct and then have it count towards the Jordan ceiling”.70
Since Cody, it seems that the efforts have been focused on applying the 
new framework to the criminal justice system and on resolving the issues that 
arose from its application71 including, among others, the classification of the de-
lay caused by the decision rendering process72 or different strategies to render 
the criminal justice system more efficient73.
65 Id., at para. 3, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 38 and 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para. 44. 
66 Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Cody: What does Cody add to Jordan?” (2017) 37 CR-ART 289. 
67 Cody, above, note 63, at para. 29. 
68 Ibid., at para 30.
69 Ibid., at para. 31.
70 Ibid., at para. 34.
71 See on this subject: Steve Coughlan, “Patterns in the Jordan Case Law One Year after Cody” (2018) 
42 CR (7th) 342 and Christopher Sherrin, “Understanding and Applying the New Approach to Charter 
Claims of Unreasonable Delay” (2017) 22 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 1. 
72 Oliver Fitzgerald, “Jordan and Classifying Decision Delay: A Need for Guidance”, (2017) 40 CR-ART 72. 
73 Chris de Sa, “Understanding R. v. Jordan: A New Era for 11(b)”, (2017) ADGN/RP-255, at para. 17; 
Gourlay, above, note 58, at para. 27 and following; Coughlan, above, note 62; Addario and Savard, above, 
note 28, at 3. 
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Extradition in Canadian Law
A brief word should be said about Canadian extradition law.74 Canada tends 
to administer its inter-state extradition relations by way of bilateral treaty, though 
it is also party to a number of criminal suppression conventions that contain ex-
tradition obligations, as well as to “reciprocal” arrangements with foreign states 
(typically Commonwealth countries).75 The treaty obligations are implemented, 
and the law administered, under the Extradition Act,76 which is a complete code 
of law and procedure.
While the bulk of extradition law in Canada involves extraditing individuals 
from Canada, most relevant here is the issue of extradition to Canada. The de-
termination to seek extradition is made by prosecutors at either the provincial or 
federal level, and requests are made with the assistance and through the office of 
the International Assistance Group (IAG), a specialized department of the federal 
department of Justice which acts as the delegate of the powers of the Minister of 
Justice in extradition matters. Pursuant to Part 3 of the Extradition Act, the IAG 
is empowered to communicate with the authorities of foreign states from which 
Canada seeks extradition and make formal diplomatic requests for surrender of 
individuals. That said, Canadian police and prosecutors do communicate with 
their foreign counterparts via informal networks, as is increasingly typical in inter-
national practice, and references in the case law to what information was known, 
obtained (or failed to be obtained) by “the Crown” may mask a complex network 
of intra- and inter-governmental information gathering and exchange.
Extradition in s. 11(b) Proceedings
a) The “Prince Principles”
Relative to the overall amount of criminal litigation in Canada, extradition is 
an infrequent process. Canada extradites individuals to foreign states far more 
frequently than it seeks extradition, and the 11(b) cases involving extradition are 
by no means numerous; the decisions revealed by our research are mostly from 
2000 or later. Nonetheless, there is an interesting body of case law that has devel-
oped, which both pre- and post-dates the Supreme Court’s Jordan framework.
74 See generally Currie & Rikhof, above note 1, c. 9; Weinstein, above note 11; Botting, above note 11.
75 Justice Canada, “Extradition Requests by Canada”, online: < https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/
emla-eej/bycan-parcan.html >.
76 S.C. 1999, c. 18.
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In the recent case of R. v. Prince,77 Justice Suhail Akhtar of the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice heard and dismissed a defence motion for a stay of 
proceedings under s. 11(b) due to Crown delay. The decision is unremarkable 
except for two features: first, it is one of the reasonably unusual cases where an 
extradition process figured into the 11(b) analysis; and second, Justice Akhtar 
surveyed some of the relevant case law and produced a tidy 4-point distillation 
of the relevant considerations when extradition is considered in the 11(b) con-
text, as follows:
The authorities disclose a set of principles that must be ad-
hered to in analysing the existence of a legitimate s. 11(b) violation. 
First, there is no obligation on an accused person who has left the 
jurisdiction to surrender themselves to the authorities or otherwise 
facilitate their return to Canada. Second, if the authorities are fully 
aware of an accused’s location outside Canada, it is incumbent 
upon them to act as expeditiously as possible to bring the accused 
to trial. Third, if an accused person deliberately flees the jurisdic-
tion and makes attempts to conceal his whereabouts or otherwise 
frustrate the Crown’s ability to extradite him or her their actions are 
counted as defence delay in the s. 11(b) context. Fourth, where 
delay is caused by the need to extradite an accused, this may con-
stitute a discrete event: Jordan, at paras. 72, 81.78
We will use this list as the focal point of our discussion below, tracing how 
these principles are or are not reflected in the case law, even though there might 
be subsets of criteria that we encounter in the case law, and even though we 
might not agree entirely with them as “principles”. As a prefatory point, it is worth 
recalling the questions that Jordan compels in these cases involving extradition, 
and to which the Prince principles are geared: in adding up the period of delay 
(usually measured in months), what kinds of conduct are counted against the 
Crown? What kinds of delay will be attributed to the defence and thus subtract-
ed from the Crown’s total? And what situations are properly treated as “discrete 
events”, out of the Crown’s control and thus not counted as part of the delay?
77 2018 ONSC 3033.
78 Ibid., at para 34.
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b) Principle 1: Accused Need Not Surrender or Facilitate His/Her 
Own Return
The first principle is well exemplified in R. v. MacIntosh79. In this decision, the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal stressed the importance of the fact that “there is no 
duty on an accused to bring him or herself to trial”. 
In MacIntosh, the accused had moved to India before charges were laid 
against him and was not made aware of their existence until a few years later. 
When he was indeed made aware of the charges, he informed the police officer 
in charge of his file that he had no intention of returning to Canada. Eventually, 
the accused was extradited some twelve years after the charges were laid, after 
a lengthy extradition process. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had made a mistake by 
deciding that the accused had the responsibility of coming back to Canada and 
that he could not hold the Crown responsible for the delay, having caused it 
himself. To reach this conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied on the decision R. v. 
Beason80 and most importantly on Askov, where Justice Cory wrote: “[it must be 
remembered that it is the duty of the Crown to bring the accused to trial. It is the 
Crown which is responsible for the provision of facilities and staff to see that the 
accused persons are tried in a reasonable time.”81 Contrary to what happened 
in R. v. R.E.M.82, the accused in MacIntosh did not seek to avoid prosecution by 
moving out of the country. Thus, he was not responsible for the delay and a stay 
of proceedings was warranted in his case.83
The Court in MacIntosh held that the inaction of the accused can only be 
relevant on the prejudice aspect of the 11b) inquiry84. However, this is less rel-
evant now because of the new Jordan framework that does not rely on actual 
prejudice, rather on a presumption of prejudice.
c) Principles 2 & 3: Crown Must Seek Accused’s Return… Unless 
Accused Has Fled or is Avoiding Capture
In a way, the second of the Prince principles is a corollary of the first: since it 
is the duty of the state to bring people to trial and to ensure that happens within 
79 R. v. MacIntosh, 2011 NSCA 111, affirmed 2013 SCC 23 [hereinafter MacIntosh]. 
80 R. v. Beason (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 20, [1983] O.J. No. 3151 (Ont. C.A.).
81 Askov, above, note 38, at 1225. 
82 R. v. R.E.M., 2007 BCCA 154. 
83 See also R. v. Singleton, 2014 BCCA 232, at para. 77. 
84 MacIntosh, above, note 79, at para. 50. 
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a reasonable time, then logically the Crown must seek extradition or make other 
attempts to facilitate the accused’s return. Yet Justice Akhtar’s precise wording 
(“if the authorities are fully aware of an accused’s location outside Canada, it is 
incumbent upon them to act as expeditiously as possible to bring the accused 
to trial”) correctly reflects the fact that this duty is not absolute, but rather must 
simply be exercised with a degree of diligence. If the Crown has proceeded with 
reasonable dispatch, then the extradition phase of a case is either treated as a 
“discrete event” and as neutral, or can be used by the Crown to justify any time 
by which the presumptive ceiling has been exceeded.
A finding that extradition-related delays were “unreasonable” stems from 
situations where the Crown either unreasonably did not pursue extradition, or 
failed to do so in a reasonable manner. R. v. Arsenault85 is a good example of the 
former kind of case, which typically results in a stay being granted. The accused 
moved from Canada to South Korea for work purposes, at a time when he was 
(unbeknownst to him) under investigation. He was there for nearly eight years, 
until the government of Canada revoked his passport (at the request of the po-
lice) and he returned to Canada, where he was immediately arrested. The record 
was clear that despite knowing where the accused was the Crown never sought 
extradition, and the failure to do so was primarily based on speculation by the 
police that the accused might return on his own accord or would be deported 
from South Korea.86 Even the decision to revoke his passport was only made 
after seven years had passed. All of this showed lack of reasonable diligence on 
the part of the Crown. The court pointedly noted that even though the accused 
became aware towards the end of the period that a warrant had been issued for 
his arrest, he was under no obligation to return.
Similarly, in R. v. Gill87 the accused had moved to India in 2003 and was 
charged in 2004. Aside from recording the arrest warrant in the Canadian Po-
lice Information Centre database, the Crown took no action until the accused 
returned to Canada for family business in 2013, when he was arrested. The 
court attributed the entire delay to the Crown’s inaction: despite there being a 
Canada-India extradition treaty, and despite the fact that the Crown knew exact-
ly where the accused was located and was in touch with the Indian authorities, 
no effort had been made to have him extradited. Nor did they even revoke his 
passport, which he renewed twice during the decade he was in India.
In R. v. Lee,88 by contrast, the police pursued a strategy of attempting to 
convince the accused to return to Canada from Mexico of her own accord rather 
85 2013 ONSC 5675.
86 Ibid., paras. 28-33.
87 2014 BCPC 208.
88 2015 SKCA 53.
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than seeking extradition, and the Court of Appeal found this to be a reasonable 
approach. This finding rested on the combination of several facts, in particular 
that: the police did not know where in Mexico the accused was located and she 
refused to disclose this; despite knowing of the charges against her she made 
many demands of the Crown and the police over the course of several months 
of communication; and she continually hinted that she would be returning to 
Canada of her own accord. In such a case, the Court noted, “the Crown must 
exercise reasonable diligence, but it does not need to undertake immediate ex-
tradition proceedings once a person is charged with an offence.”89
The facts of cases where the Crown did seek extradition but proceeded 
“unreasonably”, with a lack of diligence, tend to reflect mostly bureaucratic in-
ertia and delay, sometimes verging on apparent incompetence. MacIntosh90 is 
the most notorious of these in Canadian history. Over a decade’s worth of delay 
in the extradition process led to the accused’s convictions for sexual assault 
against children being vacated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, on the ba-
sis that the trial judge should have granted the accused’s motion for a stay 
under s. 11(b). A stay in the face of such heinous charges led to a significant 
public uproar that sparked internal governmental inquiries; in the end, reports 
were released by both the government of the province of Nova Scotia91 and the 
government of Canada92 that detailed delays in the process even beyond what 
had been found in the case itself. The picture painted in the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment and in the government reports is not flattering to any of the Crown 
actors involved. The Crown knew exactly where the accused was, at all relevant 
times, yet inexplicably delayed extradition for years. The accused traveled freely 
to and from Canada. The reviews of the process display periods of inertia, lack 
of knowledge and unexplained delay, including an oddly unsuccessful attempt 
to revoke the accused’s passport.93
89 Ibid., at para. 57.
90 Above note 79.
91 Public Prosecution Service of Nova Scotia, Report to the Attorney General of Nova Scotia: The Pro-
secution of Ernest Fenwick MacIntosh (2013), available online at: < https://novascotia.ca/pps/publications/
Report-to-Attorney-General-re-Ernest-Fenwick-MacIntosh-Prosecution.pdf >.
92 Justice Canada, Federal Involvement in the Case of Ernest Fenwick MacIntosh (2013), available onli-
ne at: < https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/macintosh/index.html > Both government reports 
refer to an internal inquiry that was done by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) regarding its 
involvement in the case, but that report does not appear to have been made public.
93 As a postscript, after his case was stayed, MacIntosh left Canada for Asia again, only to be tried and 
imprisoned in Nepal for sexual abuse of young boys. He served approximately half of his 7-year sentence, 
at which point he was released (reportedly due to age and illness) and is thought to have returned to Ca-
nada: Nancy King, “Strait area man convicted of sexually assaulting boy released from Nepalese prison,” 
Chronicle Herald (1 October 2018), online: < https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/local/strait-area-
-man-convicted-of-sexually-assaulting-boy-released-from-nepalese-prison-246013/ >.
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In R. v. Barra and Govindia,94 Crown inaction on drafting affidavits required 
for extradition resulted in 4 months of an 11-month period being treated as 
unreasonable delay. The motions judge held that periods of time had gone by 
where drafting was simply not being done, and for which there was no expla-
nation offered by the Crown. However, the 4-month delay was not sufficient to 
render the Crown’s overall delay “unreasonable” and the stay was not granted.
Some cases, however, demonstrate that there are limits on how far the 
courts will expect the Crown to go in its attempts to engage extradition. In R. v. 
Singleton95 the British Columbia Court of Appeal reviewed Canadian and U.S. 
case law, including MacIntosh, and explained the standard of diligence expected 
of the Crown as follows:
while the state has an obligation to act with reasonable dili-
gence to bring an accused who is outside of Canada to trial with-
in a reasonable time, whether that obligation has been met is to 
be determined contextually, considering the investigative avenues 
available to the police force or investigating agency involved. When 
an accused is in a foreign country from which he or she can be 
extradited and his or her whereabouts are known, Canadian pros-
ecution officials are obligated to pursue extradition in a reasonable 
and timely manner. If they fail to do so then, as in MacIntosh, the 
ensuing delay will be attributed to the Crown.96 
In Singleton the accused, an American, had returned to the U.S. before 
charges were laid against him in Canada. After the accused was charged in 
1997, a new police officer was assigned to the investigation and this officer 
spent several months on the case in 1998, determining that the accused was 
connected to a town in Texas. Local authorities indicated that the accused had 
been in that town but had left for parts unknown, and the Canadian police officer 
turned his attention to another case, for four years. Returning to the Singleton 
case in late 2002, he found a reference to the accused’s sister in existing file 
materials and managed to find her through an internet search; she provided 
information about the whereabouts of the accused, who had been living openly 
under his own name in Kansas. An extradition request took eight months to draft 
and was sent a month later.
94 2017 ONSC 6008.
95 Above note 83.
96 Ibid., at para. 96.
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At trial after his extradition (and more procedural wrangling), the accused 
unsuccessfully applied for a stay under 11(b), based chiefly on the four-year 
gap in the investigation between 1998 and 2002. The Court of Appeal held that 
the trial judge had erred in attributing this time to the accused on the basis that 
he did not voluntarily return to Canada to face the charges, applying Prince 
principle #1, discussed above. However, the issue was what was required of 
the Crown “when an accused is outside of Canada and his or her whereabouts 
are unknown”.97 Here, the Court held, the police having learned in 1998 that the 
accused had left the Texas town and with no idea where he had gone, it was 
reasonable to suspend the investigation: “Attempting to locate someone in a 
country as vast as the United States without any idea of where to look is akin to 
trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack.”98 The police had no “leads” 
until the investigator spoke to the sister in 2002, and it was only at this time 
they had any idea where to look, after which they proceeded with reasonable 
diligence to have him extradited.
There is certainly some force to the point that in a situation where the po-
lice have exhausted their current evidence and cannot practically obtain any 
new “leads”, a period of inactivity may be reasonable. Singleton is dubious on 
its facts, however, in that the investigator had information about the accused’s 
sister in 1998 but did not follow it up until 2002. The officer testified that “the 
RCMP computer system available to him in 1998 did not permit Internet search-
es. He was not asked when such searches could be conducted on that system”, 
seemingly to explain why he did not seek out the sister in 1998. This is faintly 
ridiculous, given that as most Canadian adults would recall, “Internet searches” 
were widely available in 1998 – to university students, administrative assistants, 
lawyers, library patrons and even criminals. The Court of Appeal strained this 
point even further by remarking, “there is no evidence as to when the infor-
mation that led Sergeant Quenneville to [the sister] became accessible on the 
Internet,”99 suggesting that the burden of proof was in fact on the accused to 
establish that this constituted lack of diligence.100 One is left with the impression 
that the Crown is given an extremely generous amount of leeway.
A similar approach is seen in Prince101 itself where the accused, who was 
being investigated by Toronto police, went to Jamaica in June 2014, prompting 
the Crown to charge him and issue an arrest warrant in September 2014. In 
June 2015 Jamaican authorities contacted Canadian authorities, indicating that 
97 Ibid., at para. 78.
98 Ibid., at para. 99.
99 Ibid., at para. 102.
100 Ibid., at para. 101.
101 Above note 77.
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the accused was in Jamaica and that they were prepared to arrest him on the 
Canadian warrant. Extradition proceedings ended when the accused voluntarily 
returned to Canada for trial.
On his 11(b) motion, the accused argued that the September 2014-June 
2015 period amounted to unreasonable delay, given that the accused was 
known to be in Jamaica (which is, one might remark parenthetically, not a huge 
country). Justice Akhtar accepted what is in our view a somewhat lame Crown 
argument, to the effect that the investigating officer “knew that the applicant 
had travelled to Montego Bay but did not know if he was still in Jamaica or if he 
had travelled elsewhere”, and that the accused was known to sometimes travel 
between Canada and Jamaica, which added to the uncertainty.102 It seems only 
reasonable that the Crown might nonetheless have made some inquiries with 
Jamaican authorities – particularly since those same authorities a) clearly knew 
about the Canadian arrest warrant, and b) eventually contacted the Crown to 
flag the accused’s presence.
Justice Akhtar based his finding on the perfectly reasonable proposition that 
“[t]he police have a limited budget and resources. Imposing an obligation that 
would require them to conduct international searches for an accused who has 
gone missing is both impractical and undesirable”, in support of which he cited 
Singleton.103 The police, he ruled, “did not know how or where to find the ap-
plicant”.104 Yet the alleged impracticability of seeking out the accused in Prince 
seems even more dubious than in Singleton; “conducting international search-
es” might very well have been an unreasonable burden for the Crown, but surely 
a phone call to Jamaican authorities to at least attempt to locate a particular 
individual who was known to have gone there would not have been too onerous. 
If it was possible that he had left Jamaica for Canada, a simple passport check 
would have revealed this.
As the third Prince principle suggests, the judicial tone of sympathy towards 
Crown interests warms up completely in cases where the accused has fled the 
jurisdiction to avoid criminal proceedings or “makes attempts to conceal his 
whereabouts or otherwise frustrate the Crown’s ability to extradite him or her”.105 
These cases are interesting because their results appear to turn on judicial find-
ings regarding the accused’s subjective intention to actually evade prosecution. 
Intuitively, this makes a certain amount of sense, since it is this kind of delay that 
cannot reasonably be said to the be fault of the Crown; so long as the Crown 
is proceeding with reasonable diligence, then delay caused by the accused’s 
102 Ibid., at para. 40.
103 Ibid., at paras. 41-42.
104 Ibid., at para. 40.
105 Prince, above note 77.
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deliberate actions cannot be said to be the responsibility of the state. As Justice 
Sopinka wrote in Morin, “(a)ction or non-action by the accused which is incon-
sistent with a desire for a timely trial is something that the court must consid-
er.”106 The devil, of course, is in the details of the cases.
R. c. Terk107 is a fairly clean application of this principle. Aware that he was 
under investigation for fraud, Terk returned to his home country of Israel. He 
was charged some months after but an extradition request foundered because 
Israel does not extradite its citizens. Years later, he returned to Canada and was 
eventually arrested. The Court of Appeal dismissed Terk’s 11(b) motion on the 
basis that he had fled Canada to escape prosecution. It rejected his suggestion 
that the delay was attributable to the Crown because they should, instead of 
attempting extradition, have tried to convince him to return voluntarily:
Imposing such an obligation would certainly not be without 
consequences; we could even imagine cases where the accused, 
informed by telephone, letter or otherwise, about charges against 
him in Canada, would take advantage of this to move or change 
his identity, thereby rendering any future extradition proceedings 
much less effective.108
A similar case is R. v. White109 where the accused fled to the U.S. in 1986, 
when he became aware he was being investigated for tax evasion, a non- 
-extraditable offence (with which he was charged in 1987). With the help of 
various U.S. agencies, the Canadian police eventually tracked the accused’s lo-
cation to California, though this was not until 1989. At that point he was charged 
with fraud and extradition was sought and completed. The Court of Appeal re-
jected his argument that the delay from 1987 to 1989 should be attributed to 
the Crown, holding:
Because White knew charges were outstanding against him 
yet refused to return to Canada, tell the Crown where he was or 
even contact the Crown through a third party, the delay must be 
attributable to him unless the Crown knew his whereabouts and 
deliberately delayed apprehending him or did not diligently bring 
106 Morin, above note 40 at 24.
107 2011 QCCA 390.
108 Ibid., at para. 43.
109 (1997), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), leave ref’d [1997] 3 S.C.R. xv.
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him to trial: see U.S. v. Deleon. The evidence before the trial judge 
reasonably supported his findings that the Crown had taken rea-
sonable steps to find White and that the Crown did not know where 
White lived until late March 1989.110
The result in White seems logical, particularly because the Crown proceeded 
with diligence and White himself had clearly left Canada to avoid prosecution 
on the original tax evasion charges, which caused the delay stemming from the 
efforts to find him.111 Yet, by emphasizing (albeit in obiter dicta) White’s refusal 
to return or to be in touch with the Crown, the Court appears to be undermin-
ing the first of the Prince principles, that the accused is under no duty to bring 
himself to trial. The suggestion that he should – for some reason – facilitate his 
own prosecution flies in the face of basic Charter values and human rights pre-
cepts: it is the task of the prosecution to arrest the accused. While some effect 
can reasonably be given to deliberate evasion by the accused, focusing on his 
lack of proactive cooperation with a government trying to imprison him seems 
to prejudice the analysis.
R. v. James112 is even more troubling. Wanted for murder, the accused had 
fled to the U.S. illegally and ended up being imprisoned there for an unrelated 
crime. The officer in charge of his case was preoccupied with another investi-
gation and paid only occasional attention to the James matter, and this lack of 
attention was amplified when the officer learned that James was imprisoned in 
the U.S. and would not be released for some years. He did not seek legal advice 
from Crown lawyers about the possibility of having James temporarily extradited 
for trial. The trial judge, while describing the officer’s conduct as “not reasonable 
and…not duly diligent”,113 declined to give any weight whatsoever to the years 
of delay that resulted. The fact that the accused had left Canada to avoid being 
arrested overwhelmed the analysis.
In R. v. R.E.M.,114 the accused was a U.S. national who in 1988 was charged 
with sexual assault in British Columbia. He returned to his home in Everett, in the 
state of Washington, U.S. (which geographically is located immediately below 
the province of British Columbia) and, relying on a lawyer’s advice to the effect 
that he would probably not be extradited, remained there. Beyond not returning 
to British Columbia, he did not hide or evade attention. In the years after, several 
110 Ibid., at 240 (emphasis in original).
111 See also R. C. Jean, 2017 QCCS 4894.
112 2008 CanLII 78104 (Ontario Sup Ct).
113 Ibid., (no pinpoint available, case report is online only and has no paragraph numbers).
114 2004 BCSC 987, aff’d 2007 BCCA 154.
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more complainants came forward alleging they had been assaulted by the ac-
cused, and in 1995 the investigating officer wrote to the IAG and requested that 
extradition be pursued. However, nothing was done until 2002, when an extradi-
tion request was made and the accused was extradited in 2003.
This made for a 16-year delay between the laying of the charge and the 
beginning of trial, and the accused applied for a dismissal under 11(b). The trial 
judge was unsympathetic, oddly holding that “[i]t is true that the Canadian au-
thorities should have been more diligent in having him extradited but failure to 
do that on an expedited basis is not the reason for the delay.”115 Rather, “it was 
the accused who decided to flee from Canada to avoid prosecution for these 
 offences….it is evident that the accused has shown a lack of concern with the 
pace of litigation. In fact, it is fair to say that by his actions in fleeing the juris-
diction of the court he has encouraged the delay.”116 So far as the failure by the 
Crown to pursue extradition for 14 years, with no explanation and in a situation 
where the accused’s address in the U.S. could easily have been obtained,117 the 
trial judge simply described it as “puzzling”118 but essentially irrelevant.
Most recently, the case of R. v. Burke119 presented an interesting combina-
tion of the factors being discussed here. The accused had been charged with 
sexual offences in 1986 but fled to the U.S., explicitly to avoid prosecution.120 He 
committed unrelated offences there and in 1988 was sentenced to 52 years in 
prison. In 2000 Canadian authorities were informed that Burke would be eligible 
for parole in 2013. At this time, the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty did not permit 
“temporary surrender”, under which an accused imprisoned in the requested 
state can be temporarily surrendered for trial in the requesting state, then sent 
back to the requested state to finish his sentence. A temporary surrender pro-
vision was inserted into the treaty in 2003, but the Crown did not seek the ac-
cused’s extradition. He was paroled in 2015 and deported to Canada, at which 
point he was arrested on the original charges.
The accused argued that the 12.5 year failure of the Crown to seek extradi-
tion once the treaty amendment came into effect was unreasonable and led to 
a breach of s. 11(b). While the argument was successful before the trial judge, 
the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. Without any real analysis of the facts, 
the Court simply held that because Burke had fled Canada to avoid prosecution, 
115 Ibid., at para. 36.
116 Ibid., at para. 76.
117 Ibid., at para. 9.
118 Ibid., at para. 73.
119 2018 ONCA 594.
120 Ibid., at para. 11.
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this amounted to “illegitimate defence delay”, which did not count against the 
Crown. It remarked: “[the delay] was caused directly by the respondent, whose 
actions were not taken to respond to the charges, but were intended to frustrate 
them.”121
In our view, a problem with cases like James, R.E.M. and Burke (and, at 
least in obiter, White) is that where an accused has absconded or attempted to 
evade capture, this seems automatically to absolve the Crown of its obligation 
to pursue prosecution with diligence and dispatch. Recall the statement of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Singleton: “When an accused is in a foreign 
country from which he or she can be extradited and his or her whereabouts are 
known, Canadian prosecution officials are obligated to pursue extradition in a 
reasonable and timely manner.”122 Does this obligation of diligence end just be-
cause the accused has absconded? Burke certainly suggests so, since for 12.5 
years the Crown knew exactly where Burke was located and could easily have 
had him extradited, but simply chose not to do so. There was nothing “reason-
able” or “timely” about the post-2003 delay. James and R.E.M. are only slightly 
less stark.
Yet, as noted in the above discussion of White, this appears to undermine 
the first of the Prince principles, that it is the duty of the Crown to pursue prose-
cution; the accused is not required to help the Crown prosecute him. The Crown 
either has this duty or it does not; and bringing in the second of the Prince 
principles, it is illogical to say that the Crown has a duty of diligence unless the 
accused is making it more difficult, at which point the Crown has a “get out of 
11(b) free” card to play.
This is not to say that the accused should suffer no consequences when he 
displays, as the Supreme Court put it in Cody, “marked inefficiency or marked 
indifference toward delay”.123 In principle, as the Court of Appeal noted in Burke, 
“the defence is not allowed to ‘engage in illegitimate conduct and then have it 
count towards the Jordan ceiling’.”124 An accused should wear the chains he 
forges by deliberately dragging out the process through absconding or evasion. 
This is a familiar principle in the criminal law of many states, including Canada, 
where the Criminal Code explicitly provides that where an accused absconds 
during his trial, this may continue in his absence.125
121 Ibid., at para. 12.
122 Above note 77.
123 Cody, above note 63 at para. 32 [check].
124 Burke, above note 119 at para. 10.
125 Criminal Code, RSC 1985 c. C-46, s. 475.
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However, the reasoning in the Burke-type cases is dangerous because it 
ignores an important underpinning of the right to trial within a reasonable time. 
As the Human Rights Committee has noted, one of the goals of the right is “to 
serve the interests of justice”.126 The duty of the state is not just to ensure that 
there is a trial someday, but to get the trial going as early as possible so that with 
the passage of time evidence does not decay, witness memories do not fade, 
documents are not lost or destroyed, etc. In Burke itself there was simply no rea-
son for the accused to moulder in a U.S. prison while the Crown’s case against 
him atrophied. Permitting the Crown to put the case on the backburner in cases 
where this is not necessary undercuts two important public interests: 1) ensuring 
that individuals get fair treatment in the criminal process; and 2) ensuring that 
the public receives trials that are more likely to be successfully adjudicated on 
their merits, and not hamstrung by the various problems that come with trying to 
prosecute offences many years after the investigation concludes.
There is a final, if indirect, public policy justification for keeping the analytical 
emphasis on the state’s duty to proceed expeditiously. In these kinds of cases, 
one of the primary facts is that the Crown is aware that a person accused in 
Canada of (what is usually) a serious crime is at large in a foreign state. In light of 
cases like James (serial child sexual abuser) and Burke (convicted murderer), it is 
worth giving consideration to the protection of the public in that foreign state as 
well.127 This would not be so much a matter of constitutional duty but of comity 
between states in the fight against transnational crime. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court of Canada128 and the Ontario Court of Appeal129 have suggested that this 
sort of comity is a powerful legal principle in matter relating to the exercise of 
Canada’s criminal jurisdiction.
Thus, we suggest that the third Prince principle is mis-cast, since the fo-
cus should be on whether the Crown was exercising reasonable diligence. It 
could be re-stated as follows: if an accused person deliberately flees the juris-
diction and makes attempts to conceal his whereabouts or otherwise frustrate 
the Crown’s ability to extradite him or her, their actions are counted as defence 
delay, so long as the Crown continues to exercise reasonable diligence in its pur-
suit of the accused. This would allow for decisions like Terk and White, where the 
accused’s actions actually prevented the Crown from acting more quickly, but 
deter situations like James, R.E.M. and Burke, where the Crown unnecessarily 
abandoned its pursuit of the case for periods of time.
126 Lumanog and Santos v. The Philippines, UN Doc CCPR/C/92/D/1466/2006 (2008).
127 We owe this observation to Donna L. Davis.
128 Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178.
129 2009 ONCA 151, leave to appeal to the SCC granted but abandoned, [2009] SCCA No. 186.
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d) Principle 4: Delay Caused by Need to Extradite is a “Discrete 
Event”
As previously mentioned, Jordan specifically mentions that the extradition 
process itself qualifies as a discrete event, thus justifying a delay that otherwise 
would be unreasonable.130 To some extent, this must stem from the fact that 
once the extradition request is in the hands of the requested state, the Canadian 
authorities have no control, which prevents this period from being attributed to 
the Crown.131 This makes sense and reflects long-settled law that the Charter 
cannot apply to the actions of foreign authorities.132
However, there is one controversy remaining on this matter. As noted above, 
in R. v. Barra and Govindia133, the Court held that a 19-month extradition process 
in the case of the accused Barra was a discrete event, except for a 4-month por-
tion which was attributed to the Crown on the basis that it had failed to demon-
strate that it had proceeded with reasonable diligence in the extradition process. 
While the Court mentions that “it is not the duty of this Court to micro-manage 
the dates and every response time for [the extradition period]”134, it still deducted 
the periods where the Crown was not actively pursuing extradition. 
On the contrary, the Court in Prince stated that the Jordan framework – with 
its global approach that does not focus on qualifying specific periods of the delay 
– prevents the courts from dissecting the delay to determine if a faster extradi-
tion was possible.135 Thus, the Court disagreed with Barra and concluded that 
the entire extradition process qualifies as a discrete event, inter alia because it 
is not clear what period of time would be deemed reasonable in the extradition 
context.136 
Considering both decisions were rendered after Jordan and that they both 
come from the same level of court, it is difficult at this point in time to evaluate 
which argument will prevail. However, what is certain is that a delay caused by 
an extradition proceeding, whether partially or totally, will qualify as an exception-
al circumstance under the Jordan framework.
130 Jordan, above, note 50, at para. 72 and 81.
131 R. v. Murphy, 2002 CanLII 54039 (NL SC). 
132 R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 SCR 562; R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 SCR 207.
133 R. v. Barra and Govindia, 2017 ONSC 6008. 
134 Ibid., at para. 62. 
135 Prince, above, note 77, at para. 54. 
136 Ibid., at para. 56. 
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Conclusion
As the above description indicates, as far as being an exemplar of state 
practice under the ICCPR, the manner in which Canada is administering the right 
to trial within a reasonable time is fairly consistent with the overall parameters 
set by the Human Rights Committee. Authorities are required to ensure, with 
reasonable diligence, that the period between charge and trial does not stretch 
on unnecessarily. This protects the interests of the individual but also serves 
important public policy goals.
Assessing what is a “reasonable” time is a very contextual and fact-specific 
exercise, and it is driven by the conduct of both the state and the individual. 
Practically speaking, this highlights the importance of a robust regime of eviden-
tiary disclosure to the accused by the state, since the question of reasonability 
cannot be assessed by the courts in a vacuum. Factual parsing is key to properly 
assessing delay.
As trite as it sounds, it is important to remember that this is a human right, 
and therefore the analytical starting point is the duty of the state to administer 
the criminal process appropriately and in a fair manner. As has been discussed 
here, this is where Canadian law falls down in some places, since there has been 
a tendency on the courts to relax the Crown’s obligation of diligence completely 
where the accused has deliberately attempted to frustrate a police investigation 
by fleeing the country and/or evading the police. It is possible, and indeed ap-
propriate, to hold the accused to account for these actions, as he should not be 
able to manufacture delay and then have this held against the Crown. However, 
it is against the entire policy basis of the right itself to allow this to relieve the state 
of its duty of diligent pursuit. As we have argued, the balance can be struck in a 
way that provides accountability for the accused’s actions but ensures the state 
does not allow the prosecution to atrophy unnecessarily.
